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Abstract 
The electoral consequences of variations in economic growth on vote volatility are analyzed on a 
panel of fourteen Indian states between 1957 and 2013.  Two measures of volatility are used: first 
changes in party vote shares at the assembly level and the state average of volatilities constructed at 
the constituency level. While the results suggest that both volatilities are reduced by higher income 
growth rates, volatility at the constituency level is found to be somewhat more sensitive to growth 
rates. Examination of the periodicity of income growth’s impact finds that the growth rate in the final 
year of governance has a stronger effect on volatility than does the average income growth rate 
arising over the entire election cycle.  We also find that vote switching responds more to negative 
rather than positive growth changes and, by decomposing volatility, find that growth changes affect 
internal vote shifting more than between established parties and new comers.  More generally the 
responsiveness of volatility to set of economic and political characteristics of the state suggests that 
theories of economic voting have an important role to play in understanding electoral outcomes 
and hence the process of development. 
 
JEL Code: D72, O11, O43, R11 
Key Words: Vote volatility, Economic voting, Indian States, Political business cycle, growth 
asymmetries 
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1. Introduction: 
 
In most democracies political parties compete in elections by promising to provide voters policies 
that will deliver greater economic prosperity. Hence it is natural to expect that voters will react 
to economic conditions and hold the incumbent party/coalition responsible for the performance 
of the economy. If the incumbent fails to deliver on its electoral promise, voters could be 
expected to drop their support for the governing party/coalition and switch their vote to one of 
the opposition parties or one of the promising new arrivals. Voters switching parties to punish 
the governing party/coalition for poor economic outcomes arising during its tenure would then 
increase vote volatility in the upcoming election. 
 
The impact of changing economic circumstances on electoral outcomes has been widely studied 
but primarily within developed economies and primarily with respect to whether the incumbent 
party or party coalition loses either the upcoming election or a portion of its vote share (Pacek 
and Radcliff, 1995; Brender and Drazen, 2008; and Gupta and Panagariya, 2014).1 While the 
majority of studies find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that economic conditions matter 
(for India see Khemani (2004)), there are a sufficient number of ambiguous findings to suggest 
that winning versus losing and/or the size of the change in an incumbent’s vote share may be too 
narrow a measure to capture the full impact of economic conditions on election outcomes 
(Arcelus and Meltzer, 1975; Bengtsson, 2004; Evans and Anderson, 2006; and Vaishnav and 
Swanson, 2015).2 Moreover, economic conditions can generate more effects on voting behavior 
and electoral stability than just those experienced by the incumbent party. Not only can an 
incumbent be punished for producing poor economic conditions without necessarily losing the 
next election, but disappointing performance may prompt the redirection of votes among 
established parties and/or between the established and newly arising opposition parties. This 
suggests that measuring changes in support through changes in the vote shares received by all 
competing parties may allow for a more continuous and precise measure of the influence of 
economic conditions on the stability of parties and the electoral process. It is perhaps for this 
reason that the literature has focused more recently on vote volatility. 
 
Our work contributes to the growing literature on electoral volatility in four interrelated ways. 
First, while the relationship between economic conditions and political instability has been a 
topic of growing interest, empirical work using economic variables to explain political instability 
is still largely confined to cross-country analysis (Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Aisen and Veiga, 2013; 
and Dassonneville and Hooghe, 2017) and country-specific analysis largely confined to those in 
developed countries (Van Der Meer et al., 2012; Dassonneville, 2016; and Dassonneville and 
Stiers, 2018). Studies focusing specifically on developing countries are slowly beginning to appear 
                                                          
1 As Nadeau et al. (2012: 565) conclude “the economy is not a mirage. Voters see it, and see it rather clearly, when 
they exercise their choice.” 
2 Perhaps most strongly, Bengtsson (2004: 765) concludes that “[t]he result of the study shows without doubt that 
a universal economic effect cannot be demonstrated at the aggregate level.” More conditionally, Bloom and Price 
(1975) and others suggest that weak findings overall are the result of an asymmetric response to recessions as 
opposed to prosperity while Vaishnav and Swanson (2015) find support for economic variables in India only in the 
post 2000 time period. 
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(see, for example, Roberts and Wibbels (1999) and Kuenzi et al. (Forthcoming) on Latin America 
and Africa, respectively) but, as yet, only Noorudin and Chhibber (2008) have utilized the diversity 
of India’s states to analyze electoral volatility. In their study covering 15 Indian states over the 
1967 to 2004 time period, Noorudin and Chhibber argue that fiscal space (i.e. the space within 
the government budget that allows for higher spending without jeopardizing financial stability) 
is the key determinant of state wide electoral volatility, with economic conditions such as the 
level of per capita income and its growth having no significant influence on volatility. In this paper 
we re-examine electoral volatility within Indian states by extending their study backwards to 
1957 and forward to 2013.3 The sharing of a common British parliamentary political heritage in 
combination with its wide range of ethnic, cultural and economic diversity makes the Indian 
states an ideal setting in which to test a wider range of hypotheses on volatility. In doing so we 
find results that modify somewhat the conclusions made by Noorudin and Chhibber. 
 
A second and more technical innovation is related to how electoral volatility is measured. All 
current studies of vote or seat volatility measure electoral volatility by using party outcomes at 
the aggregate legislature/parliament level. However, Katz et al. (1997) has argued that measuring 
volatility by aggregating from the constituency level upward is more meaningful than simply 
using state level election results. In our work we calculate volatility both at the state assembly 
level and by aggregating upwards from the constituency. To the best of our knowledge, no study 
has used constituency-based volatility to study the economic reasons for vote shifting nor 
considered empirically what difference the use of constituency-based volatility makes. 
 
Arguing that voters have deteriorating memories and respond more favorably in elections when 
government delivers visible public goods and services towards the end of the electoral tenure, 
Ferris and Dash (2016) show that Indian state governments do spend increasing amounts on 
highly visible physical infrastructure as the election approaches. Hence applying the 
‘deteriorating memory of voters’ to vote shifting’s in the context of the political business cycle 
model is the third contribution of this paper. 
 
Finally, there are two specific dimensions of vote volatility that have received much current 
attention. First a number of recent studies have questioned whether voter response to good and 
bad economic conditions is symmetric. The competing hypothesis is that the level of punishment 
voters inflict on incumbents for poor economic performance will be much stronger than the 
voting reward they confer under economic prosperity (Nannestad and Paldam, 1997; Singer, 
2011; Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck, 2014). Other recent studies have argued that vote volatility 
consists of two distinct types: volatility arising from the entry and exit of parties (Type A volatility) 
versus vote volatility arising from voters switching among existing parties (Type B volatility). The 
hypothesis here is that Type A volatility is more sensitive to economic outcomes than Type B 
volatility (Birch, 2003; Golosov, 2004; Sikk, 2005; Tavits, 2008; Powell and Tucker, 2014; and 
                                                          
3 The Indian states included in our study are: Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya 
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. Assam was excluded 
because it was subdivided twice during the 70’s and 80’s and because it has experienced long periods of communal 
tension with associated outbreaks of violence. Jammu and Kashmir was excluded for similar reasons. 
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Mainwaring et al., 2017). In addition to testing both of these hypotheses on India’s states, we 
examine the extent to which the economic outcomes in adjacent states impact own state voters’ 
evaluation of their incumbent government’s performance. Does better own state economic 
performance relative to its neighbors reduce vote volatility in state elections? 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss data and 
variables used in this study. Section 3 starts with presenting and discussing the baseline results 
on the effects of growth on volatility. A number of robustness tests are carried out to check the 
sensitivity of baseline results. Section 3 ends with discussing these results. In section 4, we 
analyze the results of the extensions of the economic voting hypothesis. Section 5 presents the 
concluding remarks. 
 
2. Data and Variable Descriptions: 
 
The data used in this study come from a wide variety of sources (source details and descriptive 
statistics are given in Table A1 of the Appendix). The electoral variables on assembly election 
outcomes are constructed from information collected from the Election Commission of India.4 
Data on state populations and gross domestic products (SGDP) come from the Indian Central 
Statistical Organization (CSO) while fiscal data is taken from the Reserve Bank of India Bulletin. 
The combination of these sources allows us to test our volatility hypotheses on Indian states over 
the period 1957–2013. More specifically, our dataset covers the 179 assembly elections that took 
place in 14 major Indian states over 56 years. The states and their election periods are listed in 
Table A2 of the Appendix. 
 
Following Przeworski and Sprague (1971) and Pedersen (1979), electoral volatility can be defined 
as: 
 
 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 ≡
∑ |𝑣𝑝𝑡−𝑣𝑝𝑡−1|
𝑛
𝑝=1
2
 ,                      (1) 
 
where 𝑣𝑝𝑡 is the vote/seat share of party p in election t. It measures the net extent of vote/seat 
shifting among political parties between consecutive elections.5 The volatility index varies 
between 0 (a stable political system) and 1 (an unstable political system). Using this definition we 
calculated vote volatilities both at the assembly level and as aggregated upwards from the 
constituency level (weighted by each constituency’s share of the aggregate vote). Calculating 
vote or seat volatility at the assembly level is straight-forward.  However, adjustments must be 
made for the constituency-based measure because redistricting creates new constituencies that 
                                                          
4 State legislatures in India are known as assemblies. Elections at the state level are commonly known as assembly 
elections. 
5 Every election in India brings in many new parties and many parties cease to exist. To talk meaningfully about vote 
volatility across parties we define a party as one of the top ten vote receiving state parties in three successive 
elections or one that has received more than 8 percent of the vote in one election. Under this criterion, the number 
of political parties varies from 14 in Gujarat to 24 in Uttar Pradesh during our period of study while accounting for 
more than 90 percent of the vote in each assembly election. 
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cannot be matched across time.6 Because the calculation of a constituency’s volatility requires a 
voting outcome from the past election, we first linked electoral constituencies with their 
administrative district and then used the party average across that district to construct a proxy 
past history for each new constituency.7 
 
Figure 1 provides a descriptive overview of the evolution of both constituency and assembly-
based volatilities over time for each of our 14 Indian states. Perhaps the most visible features of 
Figure 1 are that with few exceptions the constituency and assembly volatilities move together 
in all states and that average volatility at constituency level is usually higher (roughly a quarter 
higher) than that calculated at the assembly level. While neither shows a strong time trend over 
the entire period, both volatilities exhibit a steady rise through the 1975-77 National Emergency 
followed by a slight downward trend, most apparent in the assembly-based measure.  
 
A more detailed look at state outcomes indicates that volatility has evolved somewhat differently 
across the states. To some extent this reflects the different rates at which the states reacted to 
the early period of dominance by the Congress Party. At the national level the Congress Party 
was undefeated from Independence through the imposition of the National Emergency (from 25 
June 1975 to 21 March 1977), but its hold over the electorate was already breaking down. 
However, it was the imposition of the National Emergency that produced a major turning point 
in Congress’s success.  At the national level the unpopularity of the National Emergency led to 
the first-time defeat of the Congress Party in 1977 by a grand coalition formed under the Janata 
Party. Similar coalitions formed at the state level, leading to the Congress Party’s loss of most 
state elections taking place in 1977 and 1978. The large scale shift in voting at the state level is 
reflected in the historically high levels of volatility arising in most states between 1978 and 1980. 
The elections held after the National Emergency also brought with them the entry of many new 
regional and national parties to the political system and changed the competitive nature of state 
politics. Politics in many states are now dominated by competition among state-specific regional 
parties with vote fragmentation increasing the frequency of coalition governments. The varying 
degree of success in forming stable governing coalitions tends to account for the different 
volatilities trends across states, particularly in the post-1977 period. 
                                                          
6 The constitutionally appointed body of Delimitation Commission is given responsibility for redistricting 
constituencies in India. So far four such Commissions have been formed in the years: 1952, 1963, 1973 and 2002 
with recommendations implemented in the years: 1957, 1967, 1974 and 2008. See the Appendix A2 for further 
details on Delimitation Commission and constituency redistricting. 
7 See the Appendix A2 for more details on this. 
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Figure 1 
Alternative measures of vote volatility across Indian states, 1957–2013
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To measure the impact of economic circumstance on the economic voting hypothesis, most 
analysts have used macroeconomic indicators such as economic growth, unemployment and 
inflation. Because our analysis is at the state level, however, inflation is not available as a variable 
under the control of the state government, and state unemployment rates are generally 
unavailable in India. For this reason we have chosen the growth rate of state per capita income 
as our indicator of the measure of economic performance most meaningful to state voters.8 To 
assess the time interval over which growth rates matter most for voting behavior, we use two 
time intervals: the average growth rate over the entire prior governing interval and the growth 
rate arising in the last year of the incumbent’s governing tenure. If the income growth rate in the 
last year of the prior governing period plays a more important role in determining vote volatility, 
the data would be consistent with the Ferris and Dash (2016) conjecture that voters attach more 
weight to the visibility of recent events relative to the same event arising in the early years of 
tenure. In such cases incumbent political parties can benefit by reallocating state expenditures 
through time to produce pre-election circumstances that take advantage of voters’ tendency to 
forget benefits conferred in the past. 
 
Among the political determinates of electoral volatility, the most commonly used determinant is 
the Effective Number of Parties (ENP)9, a measure of party system fractionalization. A larger 
number of effective parties increases the party options available to voters and it is expected to 
lead to greater vote switching. In India, one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world, 
the party system evolves around ethnic factors such as caste (social class), language, and religion 
(Harriss, 1999; Yadav and Palshikar, 2003; Heath, 2005; Jaffrelot (2012); and Dash et al., 2018). 
In the absence of a time-series measure for ethnic divisions in India, ENP will also proxy for the 
degree of ethnic division across states. We use the change in ENP between elections as our 
measure of the fragmentation of the party system and/or the heterogeneity of its electorate at 
the state level. Increases are expected to affect volatility positively. In more recent decades, 
electoral mandates have become increasingly fractured, resulting in the frequent formation of 
coalition governments. However in practice, most coalition governments have settled partners 
and contest elections based on a pre-election set seat sharing arrangements. As a result, while 
the number of parties at the assembly level may appear high, not all parties are competing. Hence 
as the number of parties associated within a government increases, a decline in volatility is 
expected. 
 
In India the Congress Party stands out as the most successful political party in electoral history. 
For instance, the Congress Party is the governing party in 46 percent of elections in our sample 
period. While the Congress Party is not the same political force that it once was, it still enjoys 
considerable support, particularly from voters in the rural areas of India. Moreover support for 
Congress arises in many cases by default, with voters needing a reason not to vote for Congress.  
A dummy variable, Congress, is used to differentiate elections won by the Congress Party from 
those won by others, defined as 1 if the Congress party has won, 0 otherwise. This success of the 
                                                          
8 The availability of both GDP and income at the state level allows us to use state GDP later as a robustness check.   
9 Following Laakso and Taagepera (1979), we measure ENP as: 1/ ∑ 𝑣𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1 , where 𝑣𝑖is the vote share of party i. 
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Congress Party is then a signal of the strength of partisan loyalty and likely to have had a negative 
impact on vote switching. 
 
Because of its traumatic effect on Indian politics, a dummy variable, Emergency, is used to 
account for the first assembly elections arising after the national emergency. In addition, 
presidential rule is sometimes imposed on a state when the law and order situation deteriorates 
or when no party/coalition is in a position to form the government in the middle of an electoral 
tenure or after an election. When it is imposed, the state legislature is suspended or dissolved 
and placed under direct central rule.10 Imposing President’s rule is then a clear signal of a 
party/coalition’s inability to govern the state. A Presidential rule dummy variable (1 if the rule 
was imposed during an electoral tenure, 0 otherwise) is expected to be linked with increased 
vote shifting. 
 
Volatility will also be affected by a number of other demographic factors. In India, the number of 
electoral constituencies in each state is determined as a fixed proportion of population size. It 
follows that more populous states will have more assembly constituencies and are likely to have 
a more diversified/heterogeneous electorate. Assembly size, the number of seats in the 
assembly, is then expected have a positive impact on volatility. As a young and rapidly developing 
country, India has a sizeable number of first-time voters in each election. In addition, each 
election attracts numerous peripheral voters.11 To the extent that new and non-partisan voters 
are less politically predictable than established voters with stronger ideological and/or partisan 
preferences (Hansford and Gomez, 2010), each increase in voter turnout would be expected to 
increase volatility. Because the inability to serve out a full-term signals a less successful governing 
period in a Westminster parliamentary system, shorter-lived governments would be expected to 
be followed by a larger vote shifting in comparison with governments that complete their 
mandated tenure. The number of years passed since last election would then be expected to be 
negatively related to volatility. 
 
Electoral results and vote shifting may also respond to public policy and provide evidence 
consistent with a political budget cycle in addition to, or instead of, a political business cycle.  
Studying the impact of public policy on electoral volatility in Indian states, Nooruddin and 
Chhibber (2008) have shown that constrained fiscal space hampers a government’s ability to 
deliver public goods and services, resulting in reduced electoral success and a rise in volatility. 
Here we define fiscal space as the share of revenue receipts left after meeting non-development 
expenditures. Non-development expenditures include budget items such as interest payments 
on outstanding debt, administrative services and pension payments that governments find 
difficult to cut in the short-run (Chakraborty and Dash, 2017). These are considered to be 
committed spending items. While we find that an increase in fiscal space, averaged over prior 
electoral tenure, tends to reduce electoral volatility, we do not find it to be a consistently 
significant influence. 
                                                          
10 Article - 356 of the Indian Constitution deals with the issue of imposing president’s rule in detail. 
11 Campbell (1966) defines peripheral voters as those who are less involved in political campaigns and hence tend to 
be less certain about their voting choices. 
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Finally, because successive elections are not held in the same year across states, we use the date 
of each election rather than the election number to pick up any systematic time trend in our 
measures of volatility over time. The sources of our data and the descriptive statistics of each 
variable are presented in the Appendix as Table A1. Fisher’s test for panel unit root, proposed by 
Maddala and Wu (1999), is the appropriate test for the time series properties of variables in an 
unbalanced panel like ours. The results are presented in the Appendix as Table A3 and can be 
seen to confirm that all our variables are stationary. 
 
3. The Effects of Growth on Vote Volatility: 
 
In this section, we present and discuss the results on the effects of per capita income growth on 
volatility. A fixed-effects estimator is used to study the effects of growth on volatility: 
 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 +  𝛼1(𝑋1)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2(𝑋2)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 +  𝑒 +  𝜖𝑖,𝑡,     (2) 
 
where Y represents for types of volatilities, X1 for growth rates, and X2 for other explanatory 
variables. 𝛾𝑖 are state fixed effects, e is the trend of election years, ϵ is a time-varying disturbance, 
and the subscripts i and t represent state and time, respectively. All regressions are estimated 
with standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at state level to account for 
autocorrelation. 
 
3.1 Baseline Results 
 
The coefficient estimates of three different versions of equation (2) are presented as Table 1 and 
discussed as our baseline results. In columns 1 to 3 the estimated impacts of real per capita 
income growth on average constituency-based volatility are reported and the corresponding 
estimates for assembly-based measures of volatility are reported in columns 4 through 6.  
Columns 1 and 4 show the estimated effects of per capita income growth averaged over the 
entire tenure of the incumbent governing party, while columns 2 and 5 do the same for the per 
capita income growth arising only in the last year of the incumbent government. All four of these 
coefficient estimates are significantly negative indicating that higher income growth overall and 
in the immediate pre-election period is associated with less vote shifting both at the constituency 
and assembly levels.12 These results are then consistent with the hypothesis that Indian voters, 
despite hold very strong partisan positions and social preferences,13 hold the incumbent political 
party accountable for the state of the economy at the sub-national level. In relative terms, the 
constituency-based volatility results are somewhat stronger than the assembly-based results in 
the sense that the levels of statistical significance of the growth rates are higher. It suggests that 
                                                          
12 In results that are available upon request, the covariates in Table 1 were run as a panel probit model explaining 
the re-election probability of the incumbent party and as a panel regression with fixed effects explaining the 
percentage of the vote won by the incumbent party. While the coefficient estimates enter with their expected sign, 
in neither case does the data support the hypothesis that economic conditions, as represented by per capita income 
growth rates, are significant determinants of election outcomes. 
13 For instance, Chandra (2004), Dunning and Nilekani (2013), Banerjee et al. (2014), Acharya et al. (2015), and 
Blakeslee (forthcoming) emphasize different aspects of partisan and social preferences of Indian voters. 
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vote shifting at the local (constituency) level is even more responsive to changing economic 
conditions than it appears to be at the aggregate (assembly) level. 
 
One further hypothesis test is presented as columns 3 and 6. That is, Ferris and Dash (2016) 
advance the hypothesis that voters have deteriorating memories to explain systematic 
compositional changes in the more highly visible elements of state budgets over the life of a 
government in a way that complements the presence of a political budget cycle (PBC) across 
Indian states. Here we extend that hypothesis by asking whether the volatility response to 
income growth over the entire prior tenure is less strong than the response to income growth in 
the incumbent government’s final year. The results are presented in columns 3 and 6 where both 
growth rate periods are included in the same regression model. The results in columns 3 and 6 
show that while all growth rates have their expected negative signs, volatility response to growth 
is significantly negative only for the last year’s growth rate and only with constituency-based 
volatility. Hence for the constituency-base measure in column (3), the data is directly consistent 
with greater voter response to economic outcomes experienced later in the governing tenure 
rather than earlier. The assembly-based outcome is less clear. In column (6) neither effect is 
found to be significant when both are included even though their combined effect in the final 
period approaches significance (as in column (5)). Evidence in favor of the deteriorating memory 
hypothesis is then stronger at the constituency level than at the assembly level. 
 
Among the other determinants of vote volatility, ENP stands out as a significant determinant. The 
data are consistent with the hypothesis that the greater is the fragmentation of political parties, 
the more party options and policy platforms are there for voters to choose among and this will 
be reflected in an increase in vote volatility. The estimated effects are highly significant in all 
models. Assembly size, used to capture the scale and heterogeneity of the state is seen to affect 
volatility positively as expected, but significantly only at the assembly level. Because the size of 
the electorate in individual constituencies is more or less the same within and across states, it 
not surprising to see that assembly size is much less significant for individual constituencies. The 
findings for the change in voter turnout are in line with those found by Nooruddin and Chhibber’s 
(2008) and do suggest that voter turnout does not play as important a role in Indian states as it 
has elsewhere (see, for example, Hansford and Gomez, 2010). As expected, the smaller are the 
‘Years since the last election’, the larger does vote shifting tend to be, but the results are weak 
and become significant (at 10 percent) only in column 1. On the other hand, as the size of a 
governing coalition increases, volatility declines. The estimated effect, however, is bigger and 
more consistent at the assembly level than at the constituency level. This may be due to pre-
election coalition governments reducing the actual number of parties competing against each 
other at the assembly level. This may be less relevant to the constituencies where regional 
differences and concerns may make the total number of competing parties at the state level less 
important. The results of including a dummy variable for Congress suggest that votes tend to get 
consolidated under the Congress Party rule, but the partisan effect of Congress never becomes 
statistically significant. 
 
Table 1 
The impact of income growth rates on vote volatility in Indian states, 1957–2013  
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 Volatility (Constituency) Volatility (Assembly) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Per capita growth rate 
(prior tenure) 
-0.016** 
(2.19) 
 -0.002 
(0.22) 
-0.028* 
(2.00) 
 -0.014 
(0.89) 
Per capita growth rate 
(Last year) 
 -0.013** 
(2.90) 
-0.012** 
(2.36) 
 -0.016* 
(2.09) 
-0.012 
(1.44) 
Δ in Effective Number of 
Parties (ENP) 
0.317** 
(2.81) 
0.311** 
(2.66) 
0.31** 
(2.66) 
0.585** 
(2.9) 
0.59** 
(2.86) 
0.579** 
(2.83) 
Assembly size 0.165 
(0.66) 
0.077 
(0.29) 
0.076 
(0.29) 
1.39** 
(2.93) 
1.3** 
(2.74) 
1.3** 
(2.74) 
Δ in Voter turnout -0.252 
(1.56) 
-0.175 
(1.27) 
-0.185 
(1.37) 
-0.219 
(1.14) 
-0.077 
(0.38) 
-0.151 
(0.77) 
Years since election -0.121* 
(1.94) 
-0.108 
(1.59) 
-0.11 
(1.69) 
-0.073 
(0.7) 
-0.044 
(0.39) 
-0.061 
(0.56) 
Number of parties in 
government 
-0.06 
(1.6) 
-0.069* 
(1.86) 
-0.068* 
(1.85) 
-0.178** 
(2.63) 
-0.189** 
(2.73) 
-0.186** 
(2.65) 
Congress government -0.026 
(0.63) 
-0.047 
(1.01) 
-0.045 
(0.94) 
-0.112 
(1.44) 
-0.141? 
(1.73) 
-0.132 
(1.63) 
Election after emergency 0.237*** 
(4.2) 
0.266*** 
(4.22) 
0.266*** 
(4.16) 
0.508*** 
(6.69) 
0.541*** 
(7.11) 
0.537*** 
(6.95) 
Presidential rule 0.006 
(0.14) 
0.015 
(0.32) 
0.013 
(0.3) 
0.06 
(0.61) 
0.08 
(0.8) 
0.067 
(0.68) 
Fiscal space -0.199 
(1.39) 
-0.135 
(0.93) 
-0.136 
(0.94) 
-0.444* 
(1.92) 
-0.367 
(1.61) 
-0.38? 
(1.70) 
Election years -0.004* 
(1.93) 
-0.004* 
(1.83) 
-0.004* 
(1.8) 
-0.012*** 
(3.43) 
-0.013*** 
(3.41) 
-0.012*** 
(3.39) 
Constant 6.37 
(1.43) 
6.73 
(1.43) 
6.5 
(1.38) 
17.55** 
(2.29) 
19.45** 
(2.38) 
17.68** 
(2.26) 
R2 0.28 0.32 0.32 0.37 0.38 0.38 
F-Stat 25.26*** 37.7*** 36.04*** 90.02*** 48.67*** 50.4*** 
Elections (States) 163 (14) 163 (14) 163 (14) 163 (14) 163 (14) 163 (14) 
Notes: All models include state fixed-effects. ***(**)[*] = significant at 1% (5%) 10%. ? = just misses significance at 
10%. Robust t-statistics are given in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered 
at the state level. All variables in logs except Congress government, Emergency, President’s rule, and Election years. 
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The data reinforce the hypothesis that imposition of the National Emergency made the Congress 
party hugely unpopular among voters throughout the country such that the first assembly 
elections after the emergency saw large scale vote switching away from the Congress party. In 
all models the coefficient estimates are positive and highly significant. Voters also seem to be 
attributing incumbent governance failure to the introduction of Presidential rule, however the 
coefficient estimates never become a significant factor in large scale vote shifting (perhaps 
because of the varied circumstances in which it is introduced). Like Nooruddin and Chhibber 
(2008), we also find support for the hypothesis that greater fiscal space reduces vote volatility, 
but its impact over our sample period is much weaker and confined to vote shifting at the 
assembly level.14 One reason why fiscal space may not have a statistically significant impact on 
volatility at the constituency level is that the fiscal actions of the incumbent government may be 
better evaluated and held accountable for its actions at the state assembly level.  Finally, the 
coefficient estimates on Election years indicate that volatility has slowly decreased over the years 
as the party system has matured and stabilized. Its impact is more visible at the assembly level. 
 
3.2 Robustness Checks 
 
To assess the robustness of the baseline results presented in Table 1 we have used a variety of 
different approaches. The strategies adopted and their results are discussed below, the empirical 
support in the form of estimation tables is reported in the Appendix. 
 
First, India’s reputation as a fast-growing developing economy did not develop until the years 
following the first generation of economic reforms in 1991. For the three decades following 
Independence, India could be characterized as a closed economy with an average growth rate of 
about 3.5 percent. The relatively low growth rate during this period is often attributed to the 
adoption of more inward-looking socialist policies. In response to a series of balance of payment 
deficits that were becoming increasingly untenable, a series of economic reforms were initiated 
in 1991 to liberalize the economy. The major economic reforms introduced during this period 
include a reduction in import tariffs, the deregulation of some markets, the privatization of public 
sector utilities (PSUs), a reduction of taxes, and the encouragement of foreign investment.  
 
Because the policies of economic liberalization following 1991 have been widely credited with 
enabling the very high economic growth rates that India has experienced (Mukherji, 2010), one 
might expect that voters in India would have become more aware of the government’s ability to 
stimulate economic performance in the post-1991 years. To check the possibility that our 
baseline results are driven by the experience learned by the post-1991 experience, we introduced 
an interactive variable on both per capita income growth rates (prior tenure and last year). A 
dummy variable taking on 1 for the post-1991 elections, 0 otherwise was applied to both income 
growth rates. Doing so led to a weakening of the effect attributable to the prior period’s average 
income growth rate while leaving the effect of last year’s growth largely unchanged. The results 
with respect to the ‘deteriorating memory of voters’ hypothesis become somewhat more 
                                                          
14 Note that while our definition of fiscal space is similar to that proposed by Noorddin and Chhibber (2008), it is not 
identical with it. 
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significant than those found in Table 1. The sensitivity of vote volatility to the income growth rate 
in the post-1991 elections is negative in all models but are significantly so (at the 10 percent level) 
only when both growth rate variables are regressed on assembly-based volatility. While the 
results are weak, the data is consistent with the hypothesis that voters are somewhat more 
responsive to the variations in the higher levels of economic growth sustained in the post-1991 
period. Table A4 in the Appendix presents the full set of results. 
 
Thus far our analysis has assumed that the time of the election is determined exogenously, 
independent of economic circumstance. With election dates are fixed in advance, the governing 
party can choose policy over the governing period and thus be held responsible for the result 
arising at election time. In a parliamentary system, however, a governing party/coalition 
encountering favorable economic conditions can choose to call an election before the end of its 
mandate to benefit.15 In different circumstances, a governing party can unexpectedly lose the 
confidence of the state assembly and thus have an election triggered at times that are 
independent of economic circumstance (for reasons of scandal or coalition breakdown). It 
follows that if mid-term elections are triggered primarily by the governing party’s choosing to call 
an election when prevailing economic conditions are particularly favorable, then in those periods 
the negative correlation between income growth rates and vote volatility would be stronger. On 
the other hand, if mid-term elections are triggered primarily by events independent of economic 
circumstance, the negative correlation would be weaker. To assess which of these possibilities is 
more prevalent, we follow Khemani (2004) and divide all assembly elections into mid-term or 
scheduled elections. Out of the 163 assembly elections considered in our study, 34 of them were 
mid-term elections while the remaining 129 are scheduled elections.16 The results of re-
estimating the models of Table 1 over the restricted sample of 129 scheduled elections are 
presented in the Appendix as Table A5. The overall findings with respect to per capita income 
growth are weaker than in the baseline finding. This is in part attributable to the loss of sample 
size. To the extent that the falloff in significance is meaningful, however, the results suggest that 
in the terminology of the political business cycle literature, Indian states ‘surf’ by choosing the 
appropriate time to hold their election (Chowdhury, 1993).17 Like the baseline results, the growth 
rate in the last governing year plays a more important role than the average growth rate over the 
prior governing period, with last year’s growth rate coefficient having a negative sign in all 
models. However, the negative effect is significant only at the constituency level. 
 
                                                          
15 It is thought that because the overall state of economy was favorable, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 
coalition movement led by Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) called for an early election at the center in 2004. Some of 
the state governments aligned with the NDA coalition did the same thing at the state level. This is known as the 
‘India Shining’ campaign of 2004. 
16 Of the 179 state elections held over our time period, the need for a prior election to calculate volatility led to the 
loss of 14 volatility measures. In addition, there were two elections when no government could be formed and states 
were governed for a time from the center. 
17 Despite the relatively small sample of 34 mid-term elections, running the three models run over only the mid-term 
elections did produce income growth coefficients that are both larger and often more significant than those found 
in Table 1. These results are available upon request. 
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As an additional robustness check, we re-estimated the models using alternative measures for 
both economic growth and volatility. First, we replaced real per capita state income growth rates 
with the growth rate of real per capita State GDP. The results are displayed in the Appendix as 
Table A6. As an alternative volatility measure, we used seat shares in the assembly rather than 
assembly vote shares in the calculation of volatility.  See Table A7 in the Appendix for these 
results. These results indicate that the use of these alternative measures of growth and volatility 
does not disturb our baseline findings. 
 
While we have analyzed vote volatility at the state level in isolation from events arising at the 
political center, in a federation outcomes at the national level (center) and the center-state 
political nexus can impact on election outcomes at the state level. To incorporate these potential 
effects, we use two indicators. First, if the election at the national level is held around the same 
time as the election at the state level, the national election outcome may impact directly the 
state outcome. For this, we used a dummy variable whose value is 1 if both national and state 
elections were held in the same year, 0 otherwise (Same election year). Second, studies by 
Khemani (2007) and Arulampalam et al. (2009) have shown that if the same political 
party/coalition governs in both the center and the state, those states tend to receive 
discretionary benefits from the center, particularly in form of intergovernmental transfers. For 
this, we used a dummy variable whose value is 1 if the same party/coalition rules both at the 
center and in the state, 0 otherwise (Nexus). Finally, we also interacted these variables. The 
results incorporating these additional variables are presented in the Appendix as Table A8.  With 
the exception of Nexus in model 1 (at 10 per cent), none of these variables had any significant 
impact on net volatility nor does their introduction into the models affect any of our basic findings 
with respect to economic circumstance. 
 
4. Further Results: 
 
The previous section studies the effects of per capita income growth on vote shifting from the 
point of view of the traditional measure of volatility and its expected link to economic voting. 
There we found robust support for income growth rates playing a major role in determining 
electoral volatility across Indian states. In this section we extend that analysis by studying the 
relationship between volatility and economic voting in light of more recent concerns and 
developments. We do so in three different ways. Two of these extensions have already been 
studied in the context of other countries, while the third investigates whether in India there is 
evidence of a spillover onto a state’s vote volatility from concurrent economic conditions arising 
in neighboring states. 
 
4.1 Grievance Asymmetry 
 
It is sometimes argued that because individuals are typically risk averse, they will attach a higher 
weight to negative outcomes than to similar sized positive ones (Lau, 1985). Applying this 
reasoning to voters and economic conditions, the grievance asymmetry literature predicts that 
voters will not respond symmetrically to good and bad economic conditions, rather they will react 
more strongly to conditions that are bad than to those that are good (Nannestad and Paldam, 
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1997; Singer, 2011; Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck, 2014). To analyze the grievance asymmetry 
hypothesis in the context of Indian states, we test for a different sized vote volatility response to 
positive versus negative changes in per capita state income growth rates. Dividing our two period 
measures of per capita income growth into two separate variables, one with positive and the 
other with negative growth rates, the models of Table 1 were re-estimated and the results 
presented in Table 2.  As in Table 1, columns (1) and (4) refer to income growth rates arising over 
the entire governing tenure of the previous government while columns (2) and (5) focus on 
income growth rates rising in the final governing year. Columns (3) and (6) use both.  Note that 
to make interpretation easier, positive and negative changes are defined so that a negative 
coefficient sign will signal the inverse response of volatility to each respective change. 
 
The negative signs found for all combinations of income growth rate periods (entire tenure and 
last period) and positive versus negative growth rates suggests that in all cases increases in 
income growth are rewarded and decreases in growth penalized. However, of all the possible 
combinations only those negative changes arising in the final year of governing tenure are found 
to produce a significant effect on vote shifting as measured by volatility. Moreover, the significant 
effect is found at both the constituency and assembly levels. The result is then consistent with 
the presence of a grievance asymmetry in Indian states where voters’ response to worsening 
economic conditions is stronger than to similar improving circumstances. This confirmation of 
the grievance asymmetry hypothesis within Indian states is reinforced by seeing that the p-values 
for the negative average tenure growth rates are always higher than that for the positive growth 
ones. Once again it should be noted that the effects are somewhat stronger at the constituency 
level than at the assembly level. Like the baseline results of Table 1, Table 2’s results support the 
‘deteriorating memory of voters’ hypothesis as last year’s growth rate is found to have had a 
stronger impact on volatility than the average growth rate over the entire governing tenure, 
irrespective of whether positive or negative growth rates are considered. In terms of the other 
determinants of volatility, their results are very similar to those found for the baseline. 
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Table 2 
The impact of positive versus negative income growth rates on vote volatility 
Indian States: 1957 – 2013 
 Volatility (Constituency) Volatility (Assembly) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Positive per capita growth 
rate (prior Tenure) 
-0.01 
(0.98) 
 -0.001 
(0.03) 
-0.017 
(1.01) 
 -0.009 
(0.43) 
Negative per capita growth 
rate (prior Tenure) 
-0.037 
(1.22) 
 -0.009 
(0.23) 
-0.071 
(1.25) 
 -0.035 
(0.53) 
Positive per capita growth 
rate (Last year) 
 -0.011 
(1.63) 
-0.011 
(1.44) 
 -0.01 
(0.98) 
-0.008 
(0.6) 
Negative per capita growth 
rate (Last year) 
 -0.015** 
(2.69) 
-0.013** 
(2.15) 
 -0.023** 
(2.18) 
-0.017 
(1.58) 
Δ in Effective Number of 
Parties (ENP) 
0.318** 
(2.74) 
0.307** 
(2.61) 
0.308** 
(2.76) 
0.589*** 
(2.81) 
0.572** 
(2.8) 
0.569** 
(2.83) 
Assembly size 0.199 
(0.78) 
0.078 
(0.29) 
0.089 
(0.34) 
1.46** 
(3.15) 
1.31** 
(2.72) 
1.34** 
(2.92) 
Δ in Voter turnout -0.235 
(1.44) 
-0.179 
(1.25) 
-0.183 
(1.29) 
-0.186 
(0.85) 
-0.093 
(0.47) 
-0.149 
(0.67) 
Years since election -0.114 
(1.66) 
-0.105 
(1.49) 
-0.106 
(1.52) 
-0.058 
(0.56) 
-0.034 
(0.28) 
-0.047 
(0.43) 
Number of parties in 
government 
-0.067* 
(1.87) 
-0.07* 
(1.98) 
-0.071* 
(2.07) 
-0.192** 
(2.87) 
-0.195** 
(2.83) 
-0.197** 
(2.9) 
Congress government -0.034 
(0.78) 
-0.049 
(1.14) 
-0.049 
(1.04) 
-0.129 
(1.54) 
-0.151* 
(1.83) 
-0.146? 
(1.71) 
Election after emergency 0.24*** 
(4.04) 
0.266*** 
(4.17) 
0.266*** 
(4.08) 
0.513*** 
(6.26) 
0.538*** 
(6.89) 
0.536*** 
(6.49) 
President’s rule 0.001 
(0.03) 
0.014 
(0.3) 
0.011 
(0.26) 
0.05 
(0.52) 
0.076 
(0.78) 
0.059 
(0.63) 
Fiscal space -0.198 
(1.39) 
-0.132 
(0.91) 
-0.136 
(0.93) 
-0.443* 
(1.95) 
-0.358 
(1.56) 
-0.378 
(1.64) 
Election years -0.004* 
(2.01) 
-0.004* 
(1.9) 
-0.004* 
(1.86) 
-0.013*** 
(3.61) 
-0.014*** 
(3.4) 
-0.013*** 
(3.45) 
Constant 6.6 
(1.46) 
6.96 
(1.47) 
6.71 
(1.42) 
18.02** 
(2.32) 
20.31** 
(2.38) 
18.49** 
(2.26) 
R2 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.38 0.38 0.38 
F-Stat 28.73*** 48.53*** 41.02*** 105.13*** 57.79*** 77.16*** 
Elections (States) 163 (14) 163 (14) 163 (14) 163 (14) 163 (14) 163 (14) 
Notes: See notes to table 2. 
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4.2 Type A and Type B Volatilities 
 
Following Birch (2003), Golosov (2004), Sikk (2005), Tavits (2008), Powell and Tucker (2014), and 
Mainwaring et al. (2017), we divide assembly-level vote volatility into vote volatility arising from 
vote transfers among established parties (Type B Volatility) and vote volatility arising from votes 
shifting from parties exiting to parties that are entering the political system (Type A Volatility).18 
The literature that focuses on this separation predicts that the poor economic performance 
should destabilize the existing parties by making the entry of new parties easier.  Hence economic 
circumstances should affect Type A volatility more than Type B. The results of estimating our 
three models on Type A and then Type B volatility are presented in Table 3. 
 
The results in Table 3 show that per capita income growth rates across Indian states do impact 
Type A and Type B volatilities somewhat differently. However only in column (4) is a higher 
income growth rate associated with a significant reduction in volatility and this is with respect to 
Type B volatility rather than Type A.  That is the data is consistent with a fall in average income 
growth rates over the prior governing period increasing volatility by generating more vote 
shifting among existing parties.  The data is somewhat more favorable to the destabilizing 
hypothesis if only the rate of per capita income growth in the period immediately prior to the 
election is considered. However even here the data cannot distinguish the size of effect produced 
on Type A volatility from that arising in Type B.  The results do indicate, however, that volatility 
arising from the entry and exit of parties did increase dramatically following the emergency 
declaration and fall with the existence of greater fiscal space in state budgets. Greater fiscal space 
has a similar effect on Type B volatility. In the case of voter turnout the results are quite different. 
An increase in voter turnout is associated with a significant decrease in Type A volatility while 
Type B volatility does not decrease and comes close, in the case of last period income growth, to 
becoming significantly larger. That is, the data suggests that voter turnout is associated with the 
consolidation of votes among the established parties with the desire for change satisfied through 
internal vote shifting. Finally, while the data suggests that both volatility types have fallen 
through time, the overall fall as indicated in Tables 1 and 2 is not due primarily to the decrease 
in volatility arising from the entry of new parties. Rather it is through a reduction in vote switching 
between established parties, Type B volatility, that overall volatility has significantly decreased. 
 
  
                                                          
18 We have followed Powell and Tucker (2014) to calculate Type A and Type B volatilities. Calculating Type A and 
Type B volatilities at the constituency level is complicated because of the difficulty in differentiating between new 
and established parties (when some choose to contest specific constituencies and not others). Incompatibilities arise 
when aggregating upwards because the same party can be established in one constituency and new in another. This 
problem does not arise at the assembly level.  
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Table 3 
Decomposing Volatility: The impact of income growth rates on Type A and Type B volatilities 
Indian States: 1957 - 2013 
 Volatility (Type A) Volatility (Type B) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Per capita income growth 
rate (prior Tenure) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
 0.035 
(0.96) 
-0.032** 
(2.25) 
 -0.029 
(1.55) 
Per capita income growth 
rate (Last year) 
 -0.02 
(1.28) 
-0.03? 
(1.70) 
 -0.011 
(1.52) 
-0.003 
(0.32) 
Δ in Effective Number of 
Parties (ENP) 
0.529 
(1.22) 
0.517 
(1.24) 
0.518 
(1.19) 
0.827** 
(2.52) 
0.849** 
(2.5) 
0.826** 
(2.49) 
Assembly size 0.145 
(1.18) 
1.3 
(1.07) 
1.31 
(1.13) 
0.625 
(1.12) 
0.613 
(0.97) 
0.604 
(1.05) 
Δ in Voter turnout -2.08** 
(2.18) 
-2.07* 
(2.09) 
-1.8* 
(2.00) 
0.186 
(0.8) 
0.361 
(1.57) 
0.202 
(0.85) 
Years passed since 
election 
-0.086 
(0.33) 
-0.112 
(0.49) 
-0.044 
(0.18) 
-0.183 
(1.21) 
-0.145 
(0.93) 
-0.18 
(1.17) 
Number of parties in 
government 
-0.169 
(0.94) 
-0.205 
(1.11) 
-0.205 
(1.14) 
-0.09 
(1.31) 
-0.098 
(1.42) 
-0.092 
(1.33) 
Congress government -0.114 
(0.5) 
-0.125 
(0.55) 
-0.146 
(0.63) 
-0.137 
(1.53) 
-0.162? 
(1.7) 
-0.142 
(1.63) 
Election after emergency 1.09*** 
(5.13) 
1.17*** 
(4.96) 
1.18*** 
(5.21) 
-0.256 
(1.47) 
-0.239 
(1.3) 
-0.249 
(1.36) 
President’s rule -0.183 
(0.97) 
-0.229 
(1.19) 
-0.187 
(1.06) 
0.08 
(0.82) 
0.11 
(1.16) 
0.082 
(0.82) 
Fiscal space -0.721** 
(2.34) 
-0.541 
(1.34) 
-0.491 
(1.2) 
-0.303? 
(1.7) 
-0.258 
(1.57) 
-0.287* 
(1.76) 
Election years -0.01 
(1.24) 
-0.008 
(1.07) 
-0.01 
(1.28) 
-0.008* 
(2.04) 
-0.01** 
(2.34) 
-0.008* 
(2.00) 
Constant 12.38 
(0.95) 
8.68 
(0.69) 
12.14 
(0.94) 
11.22 
(1.25) 
15.06 
(1.59) 
11.25 
(1.25) 
R2 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.2 0.18 0.2 
F-Stat 25.22*** 24.03*** 27.14*** 98.88*** 19.12*** 1430.7*** 
Elections (States) 111 (14) 111 (14) 111 (14) 163 (14) 163 (14) 163 (14) 
Notes: See notes to table 2. 
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4.3 Neighborhood Effects 
 
To evaluate the performance of a government in a democracy, voters can compare not only the 
economic performance of their own government over time, they can also compare its 
performance to other governments at the same point in time. Here we consider to what extent 
own government performance relative to neighboring states influences vote volatility. Stated 
somewhat differently, to what extent would a state’s relatively poor growth performance 
(however good) encourage its voters to switch their vote from the incumbent to alternative 
established parties or new arrivals. To do so we calculate the difference in the average per capita 
growth rate between each state’s SGDP and the average of its adjacent neighbors over the time 
period of the prior government’s tenure. The difference is called a neighborhood effect. Here 
SGDP growth rates are used instead of income growth rates because most interstate growth 
comparisons are made in GDP terms rather than income levels. The economic voting literature 
then predicts that while improvements in own economic performance will produce the primary 
effect in reducing electoral volatility, volatility will also decrease (as contentment with the 
incumbent and established parties rise) with a positive increase in the difference between the 
own and one’s neighbor’s growth rate. The results involving neighborhood effects results are 
presented in Table 4. 
 
As the results in Table 4 indicate, none of the neighborhood effects in any of the six models is 
significant or even approaches significance. It follows that there is little evidence that over our 
time period growth rate differences from those in neighboring states made any difference to how 
voters evaluated the performance of the party running their own state government and 
produced any effect on their voting. The introduction of neighborhood effects to our six models 
did not improve the explanatory power of the model nor did it produce any major change in the 
basic results of Table 1, including the results for own per capita income growth rates. 
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Table 4  
The impacts of income growth on volatility with neighborhood effects 
Indian states: 1957 – 2013  
 Volatility (Constituency) Volatility (Assembly) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Per capita growth rate (Tenure) -0.011 
(1.38) 
 0.002 
(0.28) 
-0.031** 
(2.53) 
 -0.018 
(1.46) 
Per capita growth rate (Last 
year) 
 -0.012** 
(2.52) 
-0.012** 
(2.32) 
 -0.016* 
(1.93) 
-0.013 
(1.44) 
SGDP growth rate differences  
neighborhood effects (Tenure) 
-0.008 
(1.06) 
-0.006 
(0.72) 
-0.007 
(0.92) 
0.006 
(0.49) 
-0.002 
(0.16) 
0.007 
(0.56) 
Δ in Effective Number of Parties 
(ENP) 
0.314** 
(2.8) 
0.308** 
(2.67) 
0.309** 
(2.66) 
0.586** 
(2.86) 
0.588** 
(2.9) 
0.58** 
(2.78) 
Assembly size 0.158 
(0.63) 
0.072 
(0.28) 
0.071 
(0.27) 
1.39** 
(2.89) 
1.3** 
(2.75) 
1.3** 
(2.68) 
Δ in Voter turnout -0.232 
(1.39) 
-0.18 
(1.29) 
-0.169 
(1.19) 
-0.234 
(1.23) 
-0.08 
(0.39) 
-0.168 
(0.87) 
Years passed since election -0.128* 
(1.86) 
-0.116 
(1.65) 
-0.115 
(1.64) 
-0.068 
(0.62) 
-0.048 
(0.41) 
-0.055 
(0.48) 
Number of parties in 
government 
-0.061 
(1.63) 
-0.068* 
(1.87) 
-0.069* 
(1.87) 
-0.178** 
(2.61) 
-0.188** 
(2.72) 
-0.186** 
(2.63) 
Congress government -0.029 
(0.73) 
-0.046 
(1.01) 
-0.048 
(1.02) 
-0.11 
(1.38) 
-0.141? 
(1.73) 
-0.129 
(1.57) 
Election after emergency 0.243*** 
(3.93) 
0.269*** 
(4.17) 
0.27*** 
(4.05) 
0.504*** 
(6.3) 
0.542*** 
(6.93) 
0.532*** 
(6.6) 
President’s rule 0.006 
(0.13) 
0.011 
(0.25) 
0.013 
(0.29) 
0.06 
(0.61) 
0.078 
(0.81) 
0.067 
(0.69) 
Fiscal space -0.203 
(1.46) 
-0.142 
(1.01) 
-0.141 
(1.00) 
-0.44* 
(1.92) 
-0.37 
(1.68) 
-0.376 
(1.69) 
Election years -.004* 
(2.00) 
-.004* 
(1.85) 
-0.004* 
(1.86) 
-.012*** 
(3.05) 
-.013*** 
(3.2) 
-0.012*** 
(2.99) 
Constant 7.74 
(1.6) 
7.25 
(1.49) 
7.66 
(1.53) 
16.53* 
(2.01) 
19.68** 
(2.24) 
16.46* 
(1.95) 
R2 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.37 0.38 0.38 
F-Stat 140.62*** 739.36*** 362.94*** 90.02*** 63.56*** 48.97*** 
Elections (States) 163 (14) 163 (14) 163 (14) 163 (14) 163 (14) 163 (14) 
Notes: See notes to table 2. 
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5. Concluding Remarks: 
 
This paper tests the economic voting hypothesis on Indian states in the context of how economic 
conditions impact electoral outcomes as represented by vote shifting and measured through 
changes in vote volatility. Information from 179 assembly elections held over the 1957–2013 time 
period within 14 major Indian states was used to calculate vote volatility both at the tradition 
level of the state assembly but also at the individual constituency level before aggregating to 
construct a state average. This political data was then combined with economic and budget 
information from a variety of sources to form a cross-state panel based on state assembly 
elections. Using per capita income growth as our measure of the economic condition most 
relevant to state voters, we investigate the effects of income growth on both vote volatilities. 
The results suggest first that increasing income growth rate will play a significant role in reducing 
net vote switching between assembly elections and second that volatility constructed upwards 
from the constituency level is more sensitive to income growth rates than is the volatility 
measure constructed at the assembly level. By finding that vote volatility responds more strongly 
to the growth rate arising in the final period of the incumbent government than to the average 
growth arising over the full life of the incumbent government we also find support for the 
presence of a ‘deteriorating memory of voters’ (Ferris and Dash, 2016) in the context of vote 
switching. 
 
As with Nooruddin and Chhibber (2008), we find that increases in fiscal space reduce volatility, 
but with results that are not as significant as those found earlier. We also find other significant 
determinants of volatility including: the expected number of political parties, ENP, the size of the 
state assembly, and the number of coalition parties. At a purely political level, the period 
immediately following the declaration of the emergency stands out for its contribution to 
increasing volatility. Finally, the level of vote volatility has slowly declined over the years 
suggesting that within each state the political party system is stabilizing as the country matures. 
All these results pass a variety of robustness checks. 
 
From our benchmark case we turn to consider a number of recent extensions to the traditional 
economic voting literature. By studying the impact of good and bad economic conditions on vote 
shifting, we find in common with the literature that Indian state voters punish the negative 
growth outcomes more severely than they reward for similar sized positive outcomes. Here too 
it is the negative growth rate in the final year of governing tenure matters more than the average 
growth rate over the entire tenure. When we decompose total vote volatility to assess different 
voting responses to income growth we find results on Type A and Type B volatilities that suggest 
that the average income growth rate over the entire governing tenure influences only vote 
switching among established parties (Type B volatility). Growth in the last year of the tenure is 
indicated as influencing volatility coming both from voters switching amongst established parties 
and from the entry of new parties and exit of old parties. However, neither of these indicated 
effects are significant at standard levels of significance. Thirdly, after investigating the relative 
effects of neighbor states’ growth performance on own state’s volatility the data give no support 
to the hypothesis that growing faster than one’s neighbor reduces own state vote shifting. 
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It is often argued that for voters in developing countries, less electoral attention will be paid to 
economic conditions than to other underlying issues matter more, such as political factors like 
the type of party system or political ideology and/or ethnic considerations such as those involving 
caste or social class, religion, language, and culture.  This approach forms the basis for writers 
such as Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), Lindberg and Morrison (2008), and Ferree (2010) in 
Africa, and both Chandra (2004) and Wilkinson (2004) in India. While not minimizing the 
importance of any these considerations, our findings imply that economic conditions in India do 
matter and play an important role in determining voting behavior. More generally, our work 
suggests that theories of economic voting have an important role to play in understanding 
electoral outcomes and hence politics in developing countries. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 
Summary statistics and data sources 
Variables Obs. Mean SD Min. Max. Sources 
Per capita growth rate (Tenure) 163 2.86 3.26 -6.42 16.43 Central Statistical Organization (CSO), India, and calculation of authors 
Per capita growth rate (Last year) 163 2.06 6.64 -18.18 17.53 Central Statistical Organization (CSO), India, and calculation of authors 
SGDP growth rate (Tenure) 163 4.9 3.2 -3.9 19.66 Central Statistical Organization (CSO), India, and calculation of authors 
SGDP growth rate (Last year) 163 4.02 6.67 -16.31 20.07 Central Statistical Organization (CSO), India, and calculation of authors 
Volatility (Constituency) 163 0.39 0.13 0.12 0.72 Election Commission of India and calculation of authors 
Volatility (Assembly) 163 0.24 0.15 0.03 0.56 Election Commission of India and calculation of authors 
Volatility Seats (Assembly) 163 0.38 0.23 0.02 0.95 Election Commission of India and calculation of authors 
Effective Number of Parties (ENP) 163 2.79 0.51 2.06 4.16 Election Commission of India and calculation of authors 
Assembly size 163 229.98 92.36 81 430 Election Commission of India 
Voter turnout 163 0.61 0.08 0.41 0.84 Election Commission of India 
Years passed since election 163 4.43 1.12 1 7 Election Commission of India and calculation of authors 
Number of parties in government 163 2.04 1.81 1 8 Lalvani (2005) and calculation of authors 
Congress government 163 0.46 0.5 0 1 Election Commission of India and calculation of authors 
Election after emergency 163 0.08 0.28 0 1 Election Commission of India 
President’s rule 163 0.26 0.44 0 1 Basu (2004) and calculation of authors 
Fiscal space 163 38.12 11.3 20.42 79.89 Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Bulletin and calculation of authors 
Same election year 163 0.44 0.5 0 1 Election Commission of India and calculation of authors 
Nexus 163 0.54 0.5 0 1 Election Commission of India and calculation of authors 
Volatility (New and Old parties) 163 0.08 0.11 0.00 0.48 Election Commission of India and calculation of authors 
Volatility (Established parties) 163 0.16 0.09 0.02 0.5 Election Commission of India and calculation of authors 
Positive per capita growth rate (Tenure) 163 3.2 2.75 0 16.43 Central Statistical Organization (CSO), India, and calculation of authors 
Negative per capita growth rate (Tenure) 163 -0.33 0.96 -6.42 0 Central Statistical Organization (CSO), India, and calculation of authors 
Positive per capita growth rate (Last year) 163 3.7 4.13 0 17.53 Central Statistical Organization (CSO), India, and calculation of authors 
Negative per capita growth rate (Last year) 163 -1.61 3.82 -18.18 0 Central Statistical Organization (CSO), India, and calculation of authors 
SGDP growth rate difference with neighbor states (Tenure) 163 -0.13 2.81 -7.14 7.69 Central Statistical Organization (CSO), India, and calculation of authors 
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Table A2 
States and elections included in the analysis 
State Time frame Number of Elections 
Andhra Pradesh 1957–2009 12 
Bihar 1957–2010 13 
Gujarat 1962–2012 12 
Haryana 1966–2009 12 
Karnataka 1957–2013 13 
Kerala 1957–2011 14 
Madhya Pradesh 1957–2008 12 
Maharashtra 1962–2008 11 
Orissa 1957–2009 13 
Punjab 1957–2012 13 
Rajasthan 1957–2008 12 
Tamil Nadu 1957–2011 13 
Uttar Pradesh 1957–2012 15 
West Bengal 1957–2011 14 
 
 
Table A3 
Panel Unit root test 
Variables 
Fisher’s Unit root test 
Level 1st Difference 
Per capita growth rate (entire prior Tenure) 117.1*** 347.86*** 
Per capita growth rate (Last year) 169.32*** 424.97*** 
SGDP growth rate (entire prior Tenure) 146.77*** 356.72*** 
SGDP growth rate (Last year) 189.16*** 438.31*** 
Volatility (Constituency) 56.57*** 267.31*** 
Volatility (Assembly) 50.72*** 243.66*** 
Volatility Seats (Assembly) 76.67*** 198.39*** 
Effective Number of Parties (ENP) 114.39*** 323.89*** 
Assembly size 138.24*** 261.32*** 
Voter turnout 75.87*** 308.19*** 
Years since last election 102.98*** 263.69*** 
Number of parties in government 63.24*** 200.34*** 
Fiscal space 52.6*** 133.18*** 
Volatility (New and Old parties) 55.92*** 102.97*** 
Volatility (Established parties) 120.42*** 286.89*** 
Positive per capita growth rate (entire prior Tenure) 116.13*** 321.37*** 
Negative per capita growth rate (entire prior Tenure) 236.54*** 313.15*** 
Positive per capita growth rate (Last year) 176.78*** 475.22*** 
Negative per capita growth rate (Last year) 249.09*** 423.24*** 
SGDP growth rate difference with neighbor states (Tenure) 213.34*** 365.45*** 
Note: (*), (**), and (***) indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%. The null hypothesis for both tests assumes that 
all series are non-stationary. The Stata commands for the test is xtfisher. 
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Table A4 
The impact of income growth on volatility in Indian states, 1957–2013  
(Interacted with Post-1991 growth rates) 
 Volatility (Constituency) Volatility (Assembly) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Per capita growth rate 
(prior Tenure) 
-0.013 
(1.33) 
 0.007 
(0.67) 
-0.018 
(1.04) 
 0.004 
(0.26) 
Per capita growth rate 
(Last year) 
 -0.016** 
(2.77) 
-0.018*** 
(3.09) 
 -0.018* 
(1.97) 
-0.020** 
(2.34) 
Per capita growth rate 
since 1991 (prior Tenure) 
-0.01 
(0.57) 
 -0.029 
(1.33) 
-0.035 
(1.35) 
 -0.063* 
(1.76) 
Per capita growth rate 
since 1991 (Last year) 
 0.009 
(0.93) 
0.019 
(1.56) 
 0.006 
(0.39) 
0.028 
(1.23) 
Δ in Effective Number of 
Parties (ENP) 
0.314** 
(2.83) 
0.328** 
(2.69) 
0.341** 
(2.71) 
0.579** 
(2.71) 
0.602** 
(2.82) 
0.621** 
(2.68) 
Assembly size 0.169 
(0.67) 
0.074 
(0.28) 
0.089 
(0.33) 
1.41** 
(2.88) 
1.3** 
(2.74) 
1.33** 
(2.7) 
Δ in Voter turnout -0.264 
(1.56) 
-0.156 
(1.05) 
-0.181 
(1.11) 
-0.265 
(1.38) 
-0.064 
(0.3) 
-0.176 
(0.93) 
Years since election -0.114* 
(1.8) 
-0.117* 
(1.82) 
-0.109 
(1.69) 
-0.048 
(0.43) 
-0.051 
(0.46) 
-0.045 
(0.38) 
Number of parties in 
government 
-0.061 
(1.6) 
-0.075* 
(2.08) 
-0.083** 
(2.28) 
-0.179** 
(2.62) 
-0.193** 
(2.67) 
-0.208** 
(2.81) 
Congress government -0.027 
(0.65) 
-0.046 
(0.98) 
-0.045 
(0.93) 
-0.114 
(1.47) 
-0.14 
(1.69) 
-0.132 
(1.59) 
Election after emergency 0.232*** 
(4.05) 
0.282*** 
(3.91) 
0.281*** 
(3.76) 
0.488*** 
(6.35) 
0.552*** 
(6.52) 
0.545*** 
(6.18) 
President’s rule 0.012 
(0.26) 
0.002 
(0.06) 
0.004 
(0.01) 
0.079 
(0.85) 
0.071 
(0.81) 
0.065 
(0.77) 
Fiscal space -0.186 
(0.26) 
-0.134 
(0.93) 
-0.099 
(0.73) 
-0.399* 
(1.8) 
-0.366 
(1.59) 
-0.3 
(1.34) 
Election years -0.003 
(1.38) 
-0.005* 
(1.96) 
-0.003 
(1.24) 
-0.009** 
(2.53) 
-0.014*** 
(3.2) 
-0.009** 
(2.63) 
Constant 4.33 
(1.02) 
8.81 
(1.68) 
4.88 
(0.99) 
10.3 
(1.3) 
20.9** 
(2.26) 
10.83 
(1.34) 
R2 0.29 0.32 0.33 0.38 0.38 0.40 
F-Stat 41.52*** 88.53*** 75.6*** 137.18*** 48.35*** 65.32*** 
Elections (States) 163 (14) 163 (14) 163 (14) 163 (14) 163 (14) 163 (14) 
Notes: See notes to table 2. 
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Table A5 
Impacts of income growth on volatility in Indian states, 1957–2013 (With Scheduled Elections 
Sample) 
 Volatility (Constituency) Volatility (Assembly) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Per capita growth rate 
(prior Tenure) 
0.002 
(0.18) 
 0.01 
(0.97) 
-0.013 
(0.74) 
 -0.009 
(0.45) 
Per capita growth rate 
(Last year) 
 -0.007? 
(1.7) 
-0.009* 
(1.76) 
 -0.006 
(0.77) 
-0.004 
(0.49) 
Δ in Effective Number of 
Parties (ENP) 
0.351** 
(2.47) 
0.346** 
(2.3) 
0.354** 
(2.41) 
0.628** 
(2.91) 
0.636** 
(2.87) 
0.629** 
(2.87) 
Assembly size 0.109 
(0.38) 
0.015 
(0.05) 
0.031 
(0.11) 
1.09* 
(1.96) 
1.07* 
(1.95) 
1.05* 
(1.93) 
Δ in Voter turnout -0.135 
(0.66) 
-0.14 
(0.74) 
-0.088 
(0.48) 
-0.11 
(0.3) 
-0.044 
(0.12) 
-0.088 
(0.24) 
Years since election 0.333 
(1.08) 
0.257 
(0.92) 
0.273 
(0.93) 
1.01 
(1.41) 
0.994 
(1.46) 
0.98 
(1.41) 
Number of parties in 
government 
-0.055 
(1.03) 
-0.062 
(1.18) 
-0.061 
(1.19) 
-0.165? 
(1.73) 
-0.168? 
(1.74) 
-0.168? 
(1.71) 
Congress government -0.073 
(1.17) 
-0.072 
(1.12) 
-0.077 
(1.2) 
-0.172 
(1.62) 
-0.178 
(1.65) 
-0.174 
(1.63) 
Election after emergency 0.209** 
(2.42) 
0.234** 
(2.82) 
0.238** 
(2.86) 
0.462*** 
(3.12) 
0.478*** 
(3.56) 
0.475*** 
(3.55) 
President’s rule -0.043 
(0.86) 
-0.041 
(0.88) 
-0.031 
(0.67) 
-0.059 
(0.7) 
-0.045 
(0.51) 
-0.053 
(0.61) 
Fiscal space -0.105 
(0.73) 
-0.093 
(0.64) 
-0.071 
(0.49) 
-0.33 
(1.36) 
-0.296 
(1.17) 
-0.314 
(1.28) 
Election years -0.007*** 
(3.07) 
-0.005** 
(2.52) 
-0.006** 
(2.91) 
-0.016*** 
(3.66) 
-0.017*** 
(3.57) 
-0.016*** 
(3.55) 
Constant 11.41** 
(2.4) 
9.52* 
(1.86) 
11.17** 
(11.16) 
23.88** 
(2.53) 
25.16** 
(2.5) 
23.77** 
(2.46) 
R2 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.39 0.39 0.39 
F-Stat 29.27*** 23.98*** 52.16*** 34.07*** 36.16*** 31.45*** 
Elections (States) 129 (14) 129 (14) 129 (14) 129 (14) 129 (14) 129 (14) 
Notes: See notes to table 2. 
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Table A6 
Impacts of SGDP growth on volatility in Indian states, 1957–2013 
 Volatility (Constituency) Volatility (Assembly) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Per capita growth rate 
(prior Tenure) 
-0.015* 
(2.13) 
 -0.001 
(0.09) 
-0.027* 
(1.94) 
 -0.012 
(0.75) 
Per capita growth rate 
(Last year) 
 -0.012** 
(2.86) 
-0.013** 
(2.42) 
 -0.015* 
(2.05) 
-0.013 
(1.47) 
Δ in Effective Number of 
Parties (ENP) 
0.317** 
(2.83) 
0.313** 
(2.68) 
0.311** 
(2.67) 
0.588** 
(2.92) 
0.592** 
(2.88) 
0.581** 
(2.85) 
Assembly size 0.143 
(0.57) 
0.065 
(0.24) 
0.075 
(0.28) 
1.35** 
(2.9) 
1.29** 
(2.72) 
1.28** 
(2.73) 
Δ in Voter turnout -0.242 
(1.5) 
-0.167 
(1.21) 
-0.179 
(1.34) 
-0.199 
(1.02) 
-0.067 
(0.33) 
-0.134 
(0.68) 
Years since election -0.122* 
(1.95) 
-0.108 
(1.59) 
-0.108 
(1.66) 
-0.074 
(0.7) 
-0.045 
(0.39) 
-0.059 
(0.54) 
Number of parties in 
government 
-0.062 
(1.63) 
-0.07* 
(1.88) 
-0.069* 
(1.85) 
-0.18** 
(2.67) 
-0.19** 
(2.75) 
-0.188** 
(2.68) 
Congress government -0.029 
(0.69) 
-0.049 
(1.05) 
-0.046 
(0.97) 
-0.117 
(1.49) 
-0.144? 
(1.75) 
-0.135 
(1.67) 
Election after emergency 0.239*** 
(4.24) 
0.265*** 
(4.21) 
0.266*** 
(4.18) 
0.511*** 
(6.71) 
0.54*** 
(7.07) 
0.538*** 
(7.02) 
President’s rule 0.008 
(0.18) 
0.017 
(0.37) 
0.014 
(0.33) 
0.063 
(0.65) 
0.083 
(0.83) 
0.07 
(0.72) 
Fiscal space -0.205 
(1.44) 
-0.142 
(0.99) 
-0.136 
(0.94) 
-0.455* 
(1.99) 
-0.377 
(1.66) 
-0.384? 
(1.73) 
Election years -0.004* 
(2.05) 
-0.004* 
(1.94) 
-0.004* 
(1.86) 
-0.013*** 
(3.58) 
-0.014*** 
(3.53) 
-0.013*** 
(3.47) 
Constant 6.97 
(1.58) 
7.29 
(1.55) 
6.66 
(1.43) 
18.68** 
(2.48) 
20.19** 
(2.5) 
18.36** 
(2.34) 
R2 0.28 0.31 0.32 0.37 0.38 0.38 
F-Stat 30.26*** 39.65*** 40.18*** 91.15*** 50.26*** 56.26*** 
Elections (States) 163 (14) 163 (14) 163 (14) 163 (14) 163 (14) 163 (14) 
Notes: See notes to table 2. 
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Table A7 
Impacts of income growth on volatility in Indian states, 1957–2013 (With Seat Volatility) 
 Volatility Seats (Assembly) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Per capita growth rate (prior Tenure) -0.044* 
(1.99) 
 -0.029 
(1.14) 
Per capita growth rate (Last year)  -0.021*** 
(3.1) 
-0.013? 
(1.73) 
Δ in Effective Number of Parties (ENP) 1.04*** 
(3.11) 
1.06*** 
(3.17) 
1.03*** 
(3.1) 
Assembly size 0.239 
(0.42) 
0.157 
(0.31) 
0.148 
(0.28) 
Δ in Voter turnout -0.456 
(1.26) 
-0.226 
(0.68) 
-0.387 
(1.2) 
Years since election -0.307 
(1.53) 
-0.259 
(1.13) 
-0.295 
(1.42) 
Number of parties in government -0.26? 
(1.74) 
-0.274* 
(1.85) 
-0.268* 
(1.83) 
Congress government -0.19 
(1.52) 
-0.23* 
(1.88) 
-0.21* 
(1.78) 
Election after emergency 0.512** 
(2.7) 
0.552*** 
(3.09) 
0.541** 
(2.86) 
President’s rule 0.034 
(0.28) 
0.07 
(0.58) 
0.041 
(0.36) 
Fiscal space -0.291 
(0.91) 
-0.197 
(0.6) 
-0.227 
(0.69) 
Election years -0.003 
(0.64) 
0.001 
(0.21) 
0.003 
(0.65) 
Constant -6.96 
(0.63) 
-2.97 
(0.25) 
-6.83 
(0.61) 
R2 0.21 0.21 0.22 
F-Stat 31.34*** 17.25*** 23.87*** 
Elections (States) 163 (14) 163 (14) 163 (14) 
Notes: See notes to table 2. 
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Table A8 
The impact of income growth on volatility in Indian states, 1957–2013  
(With Additional Variables) 
 Volatility (Constituency) Volatility (Assembly) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Per capita growth rate 
(prior Tenure) 
-0.018** 
(2.35) 
 -0.004 
(0.49) 
-0.031** 
(2.21) 
 -0.018 
(1.11) 
Per capita growth rate 
(Last year) 
 -0.013** 
(2.81) 
-0.011* 
(2.1) 
 -0.016* 
(2.11) 
-0.011 
(1.21) 
Δ in Effective Number of 
Parties (ENP) 
0.343** 
(2.74) 
0.335** 
(2.58) 
0.333** 
(2.57) 
0.645** 
(2.99) 
0.643** 
(2.98) 
0.636** 
(2.91) 
Assembly size 0.041 
(0.11) 
-0.024 
(0.07) 
-0.028 
(0.07) 
1.24** 
(2.26) 
1.19** 
(2.18) 
1.17** 
(2.15) 
Δ in Voter turnout -0.227 
(1.44) 
-0.136 
(0.98) 
-0.16 
(1.14) 
-0.219 
(0.86) 
-0.05 
(0.18) 
-0.155 
(0.59) 
Years since election -0.114? 
(1.72) 
-0.102 
(1.39) 
-0.106 
(1.54) 
-0.066 
(0.56) 
-0.039 
(0.29) 
-0.058 
(0.47) 
Number of parties in 
government 
-0.044 
(1.04) 
-0.054 
(1.22) 
-0.053 
(1.21) 
-0.151* 
(2.12) 
-0.164** 
(2.16) 
-0.159* 
(2.11) 
Congress government -0.083 
(1.6) 
-0.1? 
(1.73) 
-0.098 
(1.66) 
-0.207* 
(1.98) 
-0.23* 
(2.1) 
-0.221* 
(2.07) 
Election after emergency 0.247*** 
(4.44) 
0.272*** 
(4.38) 
0.271*** 
(4.35) 
0.529*** 
(5.94) 
0.556*** 
(6.36) 
0.552*** 
(6.29) 
President’s rule 0.02 
(0.39) 
0.025 
(0.48) 
0.022 
(0.44) 
0.072 
(0.7) 
0.088 
(0.84) 
0.074 
(0.72) 
Fiscal space -0.203 
(1.36) 
-0.14 
(0.93) 
-0.144 
(0.96) 
-0.447* 
(1.92) 
-0.372 
(1.62) 
-0.391? 
(1.73) 
Election years -0.004 
(1.59) 
-0.004 
(1.66) 
-0.004 
(1.53) 
-0.013*** 
(3.13) 
-0.014*** 
(3.34) 
-0.013*** 
(3.1) 
Same election year -0.011 
(0.11) 
-0.013 
(0.13) 
-0.013 
(0.14) 
-0.085 
(0.45) 
-0.084 
(0.45) 
-0.087 
(0.47) 
Nexus 0.139* 
(1.88) 
0.117 
(1.49) 
0.121 
(1.56) 
0.205 
(1.3) 
0.171 
(1.07) 
0.188 
(1.17) 
Same election year × 
Nexus 
-0.064 
(0.53) 
-0.036 
(0.3) 
-0.041 
(0.34) 
-0.042 
(0.17) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
-0.019 
(0.08) 
Constant 6.73 
(1.39) 
7.36 
(1.47) 
6.83 
(1.35) 
18.72** 
(2.19) 
21.07** 
(2.4) 
18.81** 
(2.17) 
R2 0.30 0.33 0.33 0.39 0.39 0.39 
F-Stat 25.26*** 37.7*** 36.04*** 90.02*** 48.67*** 50.4*** 
Elections (States) 163 (14) 163 (14) 163 (14) 163 (14) 163 (14) 163 (14) 
Notes: See notes to table 2. All variables in logs except Congress government, Emergency, President’s rule, Election 
years, Same election year, and Nexus. 
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A2.  Linking constituencies with administrative districts to deal with redistricting 
 
Our volatility measure at the constituency level is an aggregated construct of volatilities derived at 
the level of individual constituencies. Measuring volatility of a constituency becomes problematic 
when the constituency is redistricted. A new constituency has no past and a past is required to 
measure volatility. 
 
In India the constitutionally appointed body given responsibility for redistricting constituencies is the 
Delimitation Commission. As of the present, Delimitation Commissions have met in the years: 1952, 
1963, 1973 and 2002 with recommendations implemented in the years: 1957, 1967, 1974 and 2008. 
Constitutionally a new commission was to be established every 10 years; however, in 1976 the federal 
government postponed implementation of the 1974 recommendations until after the 2001 census 
so that the family planning programs of the federal government would not be affected by a change 
in political representation at the constituency level. Further, the constitution of India was amended 
in 2002 and this led to the postponement of the next delimitation of constituencies till the first census 
following 2026. It follows that the next round of constituency redistricting will not take place until 
after 2031 population census. Taken together this means that no redistricting arose at the 
constituency level between the years 1974 and 2008.  
 
In this paper we use administrative districts to overcome constituency redistricting problem. All 
Indian states are divided into administrative districts whose size is typically much larger than an 
electoral constituency. On average, an administrative district consists of 5 to 7 constituencies. The 
Delimitation Commission reports provide details on which constituencies were redistricted and which 
were not and are available online at http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/delimitation_pub_rpt.aspx. From 
these reports we constructed a district-constituency code linking each electoral constituency with 
their administrative district. For constituencies that were not redistricted, the linking of their current 
and past historical data is quite straightforward. For constituencies that were redistricted, however, 
the district-constituency code was used to construct a past history based on the average of that 
district’s non-redistricted constituencies electoral outcomes. That is, in lieu of a constituency past we 
use the past of a representative constituency from the same district. 
 
Because no redistricting was done in years between 1974 and 2008, the list of districts existing 
between 1974 and 2008 were used to establish the district-constituency linking code. The code was 
then used both backwards from 1974 to generate a set of electoral outcomes for 1974 and earlier 
redistricted constituencies and forward for those elections following 2008. Because there was only a 
marginal increase in the number of constituencies in the elections between 1962 and 1967, and the 
number of constituencies in each state has remained constant since, we could use the coding to 
construct historical measures of our competitive measures all the way back to the state assembly 
elections held in 1962 without difficulty. However, for elections held before 1962, complications 
arose because a number of constituencies elected two members and considerable variation arose in 
both the names and numbers of constituencies. Given these difficulties, our method for addressing 
the information loss associated with constituency redistricting here is likely to be somewhat less 
useful. 
